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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
provisions of Federal Rule 19 by affirming an automatic rule of involun-
tary joinder of partially subrogated insurers."" The outcome in
Travelers also creates an exception to the Erie doctrine when a federal
forum provides a means to prejudice the jury that is forbidden in state
court. 4 In a diversity action in the Fourth Circuit, therefore, a Virginia
citizen that has received compensation from a insurer prior to com-
mencement of an action is at a disadvantage when suing an out-of-state
tortfeasor and should consider suing in state court.'
PATRICIA A. REED
X. INTERNATIONAL LAW
Foreign Government's Diplomatic Property
Exempt from Real Estate Tax
Under the traditional theory of foreign sovereign immunity,' a
sovereign state enjoyed absolute immunity from suit in the courts of
action without joinder of person that will benefit from action); FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (com-
pulsory joinder is proper whenever a risk of prejudice to absent person, incomplete relief
between parties, or subsequent litigation exists). But see Gargis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 386
F.2d 534, 534 (3d Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (joinder of partial subrogee is not necessary because
Federal Rule 17 does not require joinder of partial subrogee as a real party in interest).
"I Compare Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810, 813 (4th Cir. 1982) (Fourth Cir-
cuit rule is that defendant can compel joinder of partial subrogee automtically) with White
Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1204-1207 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (joinder of a partial subrogee under Federal Rule 19 requires examination of par-
ticular case because prejudice to partial subrogor may outweigh prejudice to defendant),
affd mem., 578 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1978).
' See 671 F.2d at 813-14 (Fourth Circuit rule of involuntary joinder of partial
subrogees gives defendant a strategical advantage that is unavailable in state forum). But
see Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949) (purpose of
Erie doctrine is to prevent noncitizen of state from gaining advantage over state citizen);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945) (federal forum should not provide occa-
sion for discrimination against state citizen in diversity action).
The purpose of diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts is to protect a nonresident of
a state from local prejudices that may exist in the state court. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938). The reason for the application of state law in diversity cases,
however, is to protect a state resident against a nonresident's litigational advantages in the
federal forum. Id.
I The traditional principles of sovereign immunity emerged during the era of the per-
sonal sovereign. Note, The American Law of Sovereign Immunity Since the Tate Letter, 4
VA. J. INT'L L. 75, 75 (1964) [hereinafter cited as The American Law]. Under traditional prin-
ciples of sovereign immunity, a domestic sovereign received total immunity to suit in
domestic courts based on the theories that the sovereign could do no wrong and that the
sovereign should not be subject to suit in a self-created tribunal. See von Mehren, The
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another nation.2 Similarly, the courts of one nation would not execute a
judgment against any property belonging to a foreign sovereign.'
Gradually the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity replaced
traditional principles.4 The restrictive principle limits a foreign state's
immunity to the sovereign's governmental acts.' A foreign state,
however, is subject to suit for its commercial activty.8 The Foreign
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNT'L L. 33, 34 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as von Mehren]; Note, Recent Developments in the Anglo-American Doc-
trine of Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 5 INT'L TRADE L.J. 298, 298 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Recent Developments]; Note, The Relationship Between Executive and Judiciary: The
State Department as the Supreme Court of International Law, 53 MINN. L. REV. 389, 390
(1968) [hereinafter cited as The Relationship Between Executive and Judiciary]; The
American Law, supra, at 75. Foreign sovereign immunity arose as domestic sovereigns
granted absolute immunity from suit to foreign sovereigns and foreign sovereigns' agents
as a matter of comity. The American Law, supra, at 75; see The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812) (host nation consented to waive jurisdiction
over foreign sovereign). The principles of equality, interdependence, and dignity of in-
dividual states supported granting immunity to foreign sovereigns. 11 U.S. at 137; von
Mehren, supra at 35 n.9.
2 von Mehren, supra note 1, at 35; Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 298; The
American Law, supra note 1, at 75; Letter from Jack B. Tate to Attorney General of the
United States (May 19, 1952), 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984, 984 (1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 app. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Tate
Letter]. The traditional theory of foreign sovereign immunity recognized that the host
sovereign had the power to revoke a foreign sovereign's immunity to suit in the host
sovereign's tribunals. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146
(1812). Unless the host sovereign revoked a foreign sovereign's immunity, however, a
foreign sovereign enjoyed absolute immunity from suit. Id.
I The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137, 145 (1812); HOUSE
COMM. ON JUDICIARY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT, H.R.
REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 27 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6604, 6626 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1487]. Under traditional theories of
foreign sovereign immunity, a friendly state regarded any judicial seizure of the state's
property as an affront to the state's dignity. Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36
(1945).
von Mehren, supra note 1, at 36. See generally Tate Letter, supra note 2, 26 DEP'T
ST. BULL. at 984-85 (emergence of restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity); Recent
Developments, supra note 1, at 302 (restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity
replaced traditional principles). The United States adopted the restrictive theory in 1952 to
allow persons doing business with foreign governments to adjudicate commercial disputes
in court. Tate Letter, supra note 2, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. at 984-85. In the United States,
however, foreign sovereigns enjoyed complete immunity from execution of judgments until
Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (Immunities Act). H.R. REP.
No. 1487, supra note 3, at 27, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6626; von
Mehren, supra note 1, at 42 & n.43; see Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-583, §§ 1609-1610, 90 Stat. 2891, 2895 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-10 (1976)) (when
foreign sovereign's property subject to execution); infra note 8 (provisions of Immunities
Act).
von Mehren, supra note 1, at 33; Tate Letter, supra note 2, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. at 984.
von Mehren, supra note 1, at 33-34, 36-37; Tate Letter, supra note 2, 26 DEP'T ST.
BULL. at 984.
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Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976' (Immunities Act) codified the restrict-
ive theory of foreign sovereign immunity.' Before Congress passed the
Immunities Act, the State Department decided whether a foreign state
received immunity on a case by case basis.' Under the Immunities Act,
courts apply the statute to determine whether a foreign sovereign
receives immunity from suit and execution.0 In United States v. County
' Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-1611 (1976)).
1 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 3, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6605. The Immunities Act sets forth the procedures that parties must follow to sue
a foreign state or a foreign state's instrumentalities. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6604. In addition, the Immunities Act declares when a foreign state is
entitled to immunity. Id. A district court has personal jurisdiction over a foreign state when
the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action and when the plaintiff has served
process upon the foreign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1976); see Texas Trading & Milling Corp.
v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, - U.S.
(1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976) (service of process upon foreign state). The Immunities
Act provides that a district court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim against
a foreign state when the state is not entitled to immunity because of the nature of the claim.
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976); see Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 307; 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605 (1976) (general exceptions to foreign state's jurisdictional immunity); H.R. REP. No.
1487, supra note 3, at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6612 (district
court has jurisdiction over claims against foreign sovereign without regard to amount in
controversy).
A foreign state is subject to suit for the state's commercial activity when the activity
has substantial contact with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1976); see id. § 1603(d)
(1976) (definition of commercial activity); id. § 1603(e) (definition of commercial activity car-
ried on within United States); see, e.g., Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 310
(foreign state's contracts to purchase cement and state's issuance of appurtenant letters of
credit constituted commercial activity); United Euram Corp. v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 461 F. Supp. 609, 611-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (foreign state's contract to send artists to
United States in exchange for fee was commercial contract); Outboard Marine Corp. v.
Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 395-96 (D. Del. 1978) (foreign state agency that manufactured golf
carts and sold carts in United States engaged in commercial activity). A foreign state's prop-
erty is immune from execution unless the Immunities Act specifically provides for execu-
tion against the property. 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976). A foreign state's property is not immune
from execu*tiofi when the property supports the commercial activity upon which the claim is
based. "Td. § 1610(a)(2). Property that the state uses for purposes of its diplomatic mission or
for the residence of the chief of the mission is immune from execution. Id. § 1610(a)(4)(B).
Congress did not consider embassies and related buildings to be properties that support
commercial activity. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 3, at 29, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6628.
I H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 3, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6605-06; see Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (to avoid embarrassing ex-
ecutive branch in conduct of foreign affairs, courts should follow executive branch's determi-
nation of whether to grant jurisdictional immunity to foreign state); Tate Letter, supra note
2, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. at 985 (State Department determined whether to grant jurisdictional
immunity to foreign state). See generally The Relationship Between Executive and
Judiciary, supra note 1 (State Department decided questions of sovereign immunity).
"0 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976); see H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 3, at 7, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6605-06 (application of Immunities Act determines whether
foreign sovereign immune from suit). The Immunities Act provides that the courts, rather
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of Arlington,1 the Fourth Circuit considered whether a local govern-
ment may assess taxes and enforce a tax lien 2 against a foreign state's
premises when the state uses the premises to house its diplomatic staff."3
In 1974, the United States and the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) established diplomatic relations. 4 Two years later, the GDR pur-
chased an apartment building in Arlington County, Virginia, to house its
diplomatic staff." Arlington County assessed real estate taxes on the
GDR's apartment building, which the GDR did not pay.6 In 1978, Ar-
than the executive branch, determine questions of sovereign immunity for three reasons.
See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 3, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6606. First, judicial determinations of immunity will minimize foreign policy implications
of immunity decisions. Id. Second, courts will decide immunity questions on legal rather
than political grounds. Id. Third, the immunity practice of the United States will conform to
other nations' practices because virtually every other country requires courts to decide im-
munities issues. Id.
" 669 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1982), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3251 (U.S.
Oct. 4, 1982). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Arlington for lack of jurisdiction. 51 U.S.L.W. at 3251. The Court treated the appeal as a
petition for writ of certiorari, and denied certiorari. Id. Three Justices would have affirmed
the Fourth Circuit's decision. Id.
" A lien is a claim that a creditor imposes upon a debtor's property as security for a
debt or charge, or a charge upon specific property that makes the property security for the
performance of an act. Assembly of God v. Sangster, 178 Kan. 678, -, 290 P.2d 1057,
1059-60 (1955). The State of Virginia permits a municipal government to impose a lien on
property to enforce payment of real estate taxes assessed against the property. See VA.
CODE § 58-762 (1950) (lien on real estate for taxes and levies assessed thereon).
669 F.2d at 927.
' Id. The United States and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) established
diplomatic relations in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(Vienna Convention) and agreed to accord full diplomatic privileges and immunities to one
another's diplomatic staffs. Agreed Minute on Negotiations Concerning the Establishment
of Diplomatic Relations, Sept. 4, 1974, United States-German Democratic Republic, 25
U.S.T. 2597, 2598, T.I.A.S. No. 7937 [hereinafter cited as Agreed Minute on Negotiations];
see 669 F.2d at 930; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. The Vienna
Convention exempts the sending state and the head of the mission from paying taxes on the
buildings and ancillary land that the state uses for purposes of the mission. Vienna Conven-
tion, supra, art. 23(1), 23 U.S.T. at 3238 & art. 1(i), 23 U.S.T. at 3231. The exemption covers
the residence of the head of the mission. Id., art. 23(1), 23 U.S.T. at 3238 & art. 1(i), 23 U.S.T.
at 3231. The sending state and the head of the mission must, however, pay the host govern-
ment for specific services rendered. See id., art. 23(1) 23 U.S.T. at 3238; E. DENZA,
DIPLOMATIC LAW 194, 195 (1976) (diplomat not required to contribute toward general ex-
penses of host government) [hereinafter cited as E. DENZA]. The Vienna Convention also ex-
empts a diplomatic agent from paying taxes on property that the diplomat holds on behalf of
the sending state for purposes of the mission. Vienna Convention, supra, art. 34(b), 23 U.S.T.
at 3242. The diplomatic agent must nevertheless pay the host government for specific ser-
vices that the host government has rendered. See id., art. 34(e), 23 U.S.T. at 3243; E. DENZA,
supra, at 195 (diplomat must pay for specific services that host government has rendered).
" 669 F.2d at 927. The chief of the GDR's diplomatic mission did not reside in the
GDR's apartment house. Id. at 934.
" Id. at 927. In 1977, Arlington County assessed real property taxes in the amount of
$24,389 against the GDR's apartment building. Brief for United States as Appellant at 4,
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lington County sued the GDR, seeking judgment in the amount of unpaid
real estate taxes and the declaration of a tax lien." The GDR made a
special appearance' 8 to contest the district court's jurisdiction. 9 The
district court held that the Immunities Act granted the court jurisdic-
tion over Arlington County's suit."0 Consequently, the court entered
judgment in the amount of taxes due plus interest and declared the
GDR's property subject to a tax lien. 1
The GDR informed the State Department that the GDR did not ac-
cept the district court's judgment." The State Department independently
United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief
for United States as Appellant].
" 669 F.2d at 927. Arlington County sued the GDR in the Circuit Court for Arlington
County. Brief for United States as Appellant, supra note 16, at 4. The GDR removed the
suit to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Id.; see 28
U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976) (foreign sovereign may remove to federal district court action
brought against sovereign in state court).
I In a special appearance, a party contests the court's jurisdiction over the person of
the party making the appearance. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 647 (2d ed.
1977). By making a special appearance, a party does not submit to the court's jurisdiction.
Id.
19 669 F.2d at 927. The GDR moved to dismiss Arlington County's complaint on the
grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Brief
for United States as Appellant, supra note 16, at 4. The GDR argued that its apartment
building was immune from property tax because the building housed the GDR's diplomatic
staff. Id. The GDR did not raise further defenses to Arlington County's claim but elected to
stand on the jurisdictional defense. Id. at 5.
The United States did not intervene in the lawsuit that Arlington County brought
against the GDR. 669 F.2d at 927; see FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (b)(2) (federal officer or agency may
intervene in action when party relies on executive agreement as defense to action). Initially,
the State Department doubted that the GDR's apartment building was exempt from real
estate tax. 669 F.2d at 927. The State Department later changed its position and concluded
that the GDR's property was not taxable. Id. at 928; see infra note 23 and accompanying
text (State Department decided that GDR apartment building was exempt from property
tax).
. 669 F.2d at 928. The district court in Arlington found that the Immunities Act pro-
vided two separate bases for jurisdiction over Arlington County's lawsuit against the GDR.
See id. First, the district court held that the Immunities Act granted jurisdiction because
the GDR's ownership of the apartment house was commercial in character. Id.; see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2) (1976) (foreign state not immune from jurisdiction of United States' courts when
action concerns state's commercial activity). Second, the district court held that the Im-
munities Act provided jurisdiction because rights in immovable property were in issue. 669
F.2d at 928; see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4) (1976) (foreign state not immune from jurisdiction of
United States' courts when rights in immovable property situated in United States are in
issue).
"' 669 F.2d at 928. The district court ruled that Virginia law provided for imposition of
a tax lien on the GDR's property. Id.; see VA. CODE § 58-762 (1950) (lien on real estate for
taxes and levies assessed thereon); supra note 12 (definition of lien).
' 669 F.2d at 928. The GDR informed the State Department that the GDR was entitled
to sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of the United States courts. See id. The GDR
further asserted that the Vienna Convention exempted the GDR's diplomatic property from
taxation. Brief for United States as Appellee and Reply Brief for United States as Appellant
at 14, United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
[Vol. 40:459
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decided that the property was not taxable.' In May 1979, the United
States and the GDR entered into an agreement (May Agreement) exempt-
ing the GDR's property from local real estate taxes provided that the
GDR used the property for diplomatic mission purposes.' Arlington
County nevertheless continued to tax the property.' The Attorney
General, on behalf of the United States, filed an action in district court
seeking to prevent the County from taxing the GDR's property." The
Brief for United States as Appellee]; see supra note 14 (Vienna Convention's provisions for
tax exemption).
' 669 F.2d at 928. In the past, the State Department had construed the Vienna Con-
vention's tax exemption provisions strictly and did not exempt diplomats' residences from
property tax, even when the sending state owned the residence. M. NASH, 1978 DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 610; see Vienna Convention, supra note 14,
art. 34(b) (diplomatic agent exempt from payment of taxes for property that agent holds on
behalf of sending state for purpose of the mission). The State Department considered
diplomatic agents to hold residences for their personal use rather than for purposes of the
mission. E. McDOWELL, 1976 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
201. Despite the strict interpretation, the United States granted tax exemptions for
diplomats' and consuls' residences on a reciprocal basis. M. NASH, supra, at 610; see, e.g.,
Consular Convention, June 1, 1964, United States-U.S.S.R., art. 21, 19 U.S.T. 5018, 5033,
T.I.A.S. No. 6503; Consular Convention, March 22, 1963, United States-Japan, arts. 7(1),
12(1)(a), 15 U.S.T. 768, 776, 785, T.I.A.S. No. 5602; Consular Convention, Jan. 8, 1963, United
States-Korea, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 14 U.S.T. 1637, 1639-40, 1646, T.I.A.S. No. 5469; Consular Con-
vention, June 6, 1951, United States-United Kingdom, arts. 7(1), 12(1), 3 U.S.T. 3426, 3431,
3435-36, T.I.A.S. No. 2494; Consular Convention, May 1, 1950, United States-Ireland, arts.
7(1), 12(1), 5 U.S.T. 949, 960, 971-72, T.I.A.S. No. 2984. In 1978, the State Department
adopted a more liberal construction of the Vienna Convention's tax exemption provisions
and decided that diplomats' residences should be exempt from property taxes. See M.
NASH, supra, at 610-13. The State Department decided to exempt diplomats' residences
from property taxes for two reasons. Id. at 612. First, the United States wanted to conform
to the prevailing practice of many other countries that provide tax exemptions for
diplomats' residences. Id. at 611-12. Second, the United States desired to act consistently
with international law, which the State Department interpreted as requiring tax exemption
for diplomats' residences. Id.; see E. DENZA, supra note 14, at 198 (majority of states that
have adopted Vienna Convention allow tax exemption for residences of diplomatic agents).
U 669 F.2d at 928. The United States and the GDR entered into the May 1979 agree-
ment (May Agreement) for tax exemption because the governments wished to clarify the
1974 agreement establishing diplomatic relations. Brief for United States as Appellee, supra
note 22, at 15; see supra note 14 (agreement to establish diplomatic relations between
United States and GDR). In particular, the governments wished to resolve the dispute over
the tax status of the GDR's apartment building and specify that the GDR's property was ex-
empt from taxation. Brief for United States as Appellee, supra note 22, at 14-15; see supra
note 23 (State Department's revised interpretation of Vienna Convention provisions for tax
immunity).
669 F.2d at 928. In 1978, Arlington County assessed taxes in the amount of $23,664
against the GDR's apartment building. Brief for United States as Appellant, supra note 16,
at 5. From January through April 1979, Arlington County assessed taxes against the prop-
erty in the amount of $17,144. Id.
' 669 F.2d at 928. The United States brought suit against Arlington County because
the United States sought to protect the United States' sovereign interests, to control
foreign policy, and to meet international obligations. Id. at 928; see Sanitary Dist. v. United
States, 266 U.S. 405, 425 (1925) (United States has standing to bring lawsuit to carry out
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held
that the May Agreement exempted the property from subsequent
taxes.' The court held, however, that the apartment house was subject
to an enforceable lien for taxes assessed prior to the May Agreement.'
The parties appealed to the Fourth Circuit.' On appeal, Arlington
County challenged the validity of the May Agreement for two reasons."0
treaty obligations to foreign government); United States v. Arlington County, 326 F.2d 929,
932 (4th Cir. 1964) (federal government has right to bring suit to enforce national policies);
United States v. City of Glen Cove, 322 F. Supp. 149, 152 (E.D.N.Y.) (United States has
authority to bring suit to prevent state action that would violate United States' treaty
obligations), affd, 450 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1971). The United States requested three forms of
relief. 669 F.2d at 928. First, the United States prayed for a declaratory judgment that the
GDR's property had been exempt from county taxes from the date that the GDR purchased
the property. Id. Second,,the United States requested that the court void all assessments
and liens affecting the property. Id. Third, the United States asked the court to enjoin Ar-
lington County from attempting to collect property taxes from the German government. Id.
See 669 F.2d at 928.
' Id. In addition to finding that the GDR's apartment house was subject to a tax lien,
the district court held that the 1978 judgment in favor of Arlington County collaterally
estopped the United States from litigating the issue of the building's tax status prior to
May 1979. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 17-21 (Arlington County's 1978 lawsuit
against GDR). The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that once a court of competent
jurisdiction actually and necessarily determines an issue, the court's determination is bind-
ing upon a party to the litigation or his privy in a subsequent suit based on a different cause
of action. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
The district court in Arlington found that the United States and the GDR were in privity
because they had a concurrent relationship to, or a mutual interest in, the same right of
property. See 669 F.2d at 935; see 1B J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.4111] (2d
ed. 1982) (privity exists when parties have concurrent relationship to same right of prop-
erty). The district court consequently held that the 1978 judgment bound the United States.
See 669 F.2d at 935. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the United
States was not estopped from litigating the issue of the apartment building's tax liability
prior to May 1979. Id. at 935. The Fourth Circuit noted that a concurrent relationship to the
same right of property applies, for example, to the relationship between a trustee and a
trust beneficiary and between a guardian and a ward. Id.; see 1B J. MOORE, supra, at
0.41111] (concurrent relationship to same right of property exists between trustee and
trust beneficiary and between guardian and ward). The Arlington court found that a similar
relationship did not exist between the United States and the GDR and therefore, the United
States and the GDR were not in privity. 669 F.2d at 935. The Fourth Circuit also ruled that
the United States and the GDR sought to vindicate different interests by litigating the
issue of the building's tax status. Id.; see supra note 26 (United States' reasons for bringing
suit against Arlington County). In addition, the Fourth Circuit held that application of col-
lateral estoppel was inappropriate because the United States sought to raise issues that the
1978 judgment did not settle. 669 F.2d at 935-36.
See 669 F.2d at 928-33.
o See id. at 929, 931. In addition to challenging the May Agreement's validity, Ar-
lington County argued on appeal that the GDR did not use the apartment house for mission
purposes or for the residence of the chief of the mission and that the property consequently
did not meet statutory standards for immunity from execution. 669 F.2d at 933; see 28
U.S.C. § 1610(a)(4)(B) (1976) (property that foreign sovereign uses for purposes of maintain-
ing diplomatic mission or residence of chief of mission immune from execution). Arlington
County asserted that owning an apartment building is a commercial act. Brief for United
[Vol. 40:459
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First, the County argued that the United States' executive branch had
no authority to enter into the May Agreement." Second, the County con-
tended that the May Agreement unconstitutionally infringed on the
County's power to tax22 The United States asserted that the district
court correctly held that the May Agreement precluded Arlington County
from assessing subsequent taxes on the GDR's property.' The United
States further argued that sovereign immunity prevented Arlington
County from enforcing a tax lien against property that the GDR used to
support the diplomatic mission."
States as Appellee, supra note 22, at 32; see 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976) (commercial character
of activity determined by nature rather than purpose of activity). The county argued that
since owning an apartment building is a commercial act, the the Immunities Act allowed ex-
ecution against the GDR's property. 669 F.2d at 933; see 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (1976) (foreign
state's property not immune from execution if property supports commercial activity upon
which claim is based).
3 669 F.d at 929. Arlington County attacked the May Agreement's validity on the
ground that a deputy assistant secretary of state rather than an assistant secretary of state
signed the note evidencing the agreement. Id. at 930. The County asserted that internal
State Department rules required an assistant secretary to sign the agreement. Id. at 930-31.
The Fourth Circuit found that the State Department had ratified the agreement. See id. at
931. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, held that the presumption of official regularity sustained
the validity of the agreement. Id.; see R.H. Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 63
(1934) (under presumption of official regularity, Court presumed that public official took ap-
propriate steps to validate actions); United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1926) (absent clear evidence to contrary, courts presume that public officials properly have
discharged official duties); Petro-Chem Mktg. Co. v. United States, 602 F.2d 959, 968 (Ct. Cl.
1979) (presumption of official regularity supports official acts of public officers).
1 669 F.2d at 931. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Arlington County asserted that the
United States Constitution does not delegate to any branch of the federal government the
authority to exempt a foreign sovereign's property from state taxation. Id.; see U.S. CONST.
amend. X (reserving to states powers that Constitution does not delegate to federal govern-
ment). Arlington County contended that an individual state therefore has the power to
grant or deny immunity from property taxation. 669 F.2d at 931. The County argued that
since the Virginia Constitution does not provide tax immunity for a foreign government's
property, the GDR must pay real estate taxes. Id.
Arlington County also argued on appeal that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 re-
quired the United States to join the GDR in the lawsuit against the County. Id. at 928. Rule
19 requires that a person be joined as a party in an action if in his absence the court cannot
accord complete relief among those already parties to the action. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1).
Rule 19 also provides for joinder when the absence of a person interested in the litigation
would subject one of the parties to multiple liability. Id. 19(a)(2)(ii). The County contended
that without joinder, the district court could not afford Arlington County complete relief
against the GDR because if the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, the
County would have to initiate another action against the GDR to collect taxes for 1978 and
part of 1979. 669 F.2d at 928. The Fourth Circuit held that the GDR was not a necessary party
to the action because resolution of the dispute between the United States and Arlington
County did not require the GDR's presence in the litigation. Id. at 929. The Arlington court
further held that the United States sued to vindicate its own interests in the tax controversy
rather than the GDR's interests. Id. at 928.
Brief for United States as Appellee, supra note 22, at 7, 20-21.
669 F.2d at 932.
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The Fourth Circuit upheld the validity of the May Agreement.' The
Arlington court held that the executive branch has the authority to
recognize a foreign state and to remove obstacles to full recognition."
The court found that the initial agreement establishing diplomatic rela-
tions between the United States and the GDR in 1974 required each
state to accord full diplomatic privileges and immunities to the other
state's diplomatic staff." The Fourth Circuit ruled that the 1974 recogni-
tion provided the executive branch with the authority to enter into the
May Agreement for tax exemption."
The Fourth Circuit also held that the May Agreement did not in-
fringe unconstitutionally on the County's power to tax. 9 The Arlington
court recognized that the United States federal government has com-
plete power over the nation's foreign affairs. 0 The court found that the
power over foreign affairs does not derive from affirmative grants from
the Constitution but rather from the United States' status as a
sovereign nation.4 1 The court held that an individual state, as a subdivis-
3 Id. at 929. In upholding the validity of the May Agreement, the Fourth Circuit relied
on the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Pink and United States v. Belmont.
Id. at 929-32; see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937); infra note 53 and accompanying text (discussion of Pink and Belmont).
' 669 F.2d at 930. By an act of recognition, a state commits itself to treat an entity as a
state or to treat a regime as the government of a state. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 94(1) (1965). Recognition may, but need not, include
the initiation of diplomatic relations. Id. § 98(1).
" 669 F.2d at 930; see supra note 14 (agreement establishing diplomatic relations be-
tween United States and GDR).
' 669 F.2d at 930. The Arlington court found that the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978
supported the executive branch's authority to enter into the May Agreement. Id.; see
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§
254a-254e (1976 & Supp. II 1978), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1351, 1364 (1976)). Congress enacted the
Diplomatic Relations Act to reflect Article 47 of the Vienna Convention. S. REP. No. 958,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1935, 1939; see
Diplomatic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 254c (1976 & Supp. II 1978); Vienna Convention, supra
note 14, art. 47, 23 U.S.T. at 3249 (states may extend each other more favorable treatment
than Vienna Convention provides). Under the Diplomatic Relations Act, the President may
specify privileges and immunities for individual diplomats that result in more favorable
treatment than the Vienna Convention requires. 22 U.S.C. § 254c (1976 & Supp. II 1978); see
supra note 14 (Vienna Convention's provisions for tax exemption). The President delegated
the power to specify privileges and immunities for diplomats to the Secretary of State. Exec.
Order No. 12,101, 3 C.F.R. 258 (1979). The Fourth Circuit found that the Diplomatic Rela-
tions Act extends privileges to individual diplomats and not to foreign states. 669 F.2d at
930. Therefore, the court ruled that the Diplomatic Relations Act was not dispositive of the
executive branch's authority to enter into the May Agreement. See id. The Arlington court
ruled, however, that courts should not construe the Diplomatic Relations Act to limit the ex-
ecutive's power to deal with foreign sovereigns. Id.
3 669 F.2d at 932.
Id. at 931-32.
See id. In holding that the May Agreement did not infringe unconstitutionally on
Arlington County's power to tax, the Fourth Circuit relied on principles enunciated in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. Id. at 931; see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936) (discussed infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text).
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ion of the United States, may not interfere with the federal
government's conduct of foreign affairs and that an international agree-
ment that the federal government negotiated binds the states.42 The Arl-
ington court held, therefore, that subsequent to the May Agreement, the
United States' grant of tax immunity took precedence over Arlington
County's denial of immunity. 3
Although the Fourth Circuit expressed no opinion on the validity of
th6 pre-May Agreement property taxes," the court held that Arlington
County could not enforce a tax lien against the GDR's apartment house. 5
The court noted that the Immunities Act exempts from execution prop-
erty that a foreign sovereign uses to maintain a diplomatic mission, but
that the Immunities Act allows execution against a foreign state's prop-
erty if the property supports commercial activity.46 The Arlington court
found that neither the Immunities Act nor the Act's legislative history
specifically distinguished between property that a foreign sovereign
uses for a diplomatic mission and property that supports a state's com-
mercial activity.47 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, focused upon the State
Department's determination, as evidenced by the May Agreement, that
the GDR used the apartment house for diplomatic mission purposes. 8
Consequently, the Arlington court held that the GDR's apartment house
was diplomatic property and exempt from judgment.49
In upholding the validity of the May Agreement, the Fourth Circuit
relied on several Supreme Court cases which hold that state laws and
42 669 F.2d at 931-32. The Arlington court ruled that an international agreement, like a
treaty, is superior to state law. Id.; see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942)
(state law must yield to international agreement); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,
331 (1937) (international agreement superior to state law because national government has
power to control foreign affairs); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (treaty is supreme law of land).
'" 669 F.2d at 932.
" See id. at 936. The Arlington court held that on remand, the United States could
litigate the issue of the GDR property's tax status prior to the May Agreement. Id. at 936;
see supra note 28 (United States not estopped from litigating issue of GDR property's tax
status prior to May Agreement).
'5 669 F.2d at 935.
Id. at 932. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(4)(B) (1976) (property used for purposes of
maintaining diplomatic mission or residence of chief of mission immune from execution)
with id. § 1610(a)(2) (foreign state's property not immune from execution if property sup-
ports commercial activity upon which claim is based).
:7 See 669 F.2d at 934.
' Id. at 934. The Arlington court found that the State Department has expertise in
determining whether a foreign government's property supports the government's
diplomatic mission because the Department has responsibility for dealing with foreign mis-
sions. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that a court should reject the State Department's views
only when the Department's views are manifestly unreasonable. Id. The Arlington court
found that the State Department's views concerning the GDR's use of the apartment house
were reasonable because the GDR used the building to house its diplomatic staff and did not
seek to earn a profit through ownership of the building. Id.
" Id. at 935; see 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976) (foreign state's property immune from execu-
tion unless Immunities Act specifically provides for execution); id. § 1610(a)(4)(B) (property
used for purposes of maintaining diplomatic mission immune from execution).
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policies may not interfere with the federal government's conduct of
foreign affairs." The Supreme Court has recognized that the United
States' power over foreign affairs derives from the United States' status
as a sovereign nation and not from the United States Constitution."' The
Court has therefore ruled that although the Constitution limits the
federal government's power over domestic affairs, the Constitution does
not restrict the national government's authority over international mat-
ters.2 The court also has held that the executive branch has the authority
to enter into international agreements that govern the United States'
diplomatic relations.'
In light of Supreme Court precedent, Arlington County interfered
with the federal government's conduct of foreign affairs by continuing to
tax the GDR's apartment building after the United States and the GDR
had agreed to exempt the building from taxes.54 Arlington County may
suffer hardship from the loss of tax revenues from the GDR's property.55
In matters that affect foreign relations, however, the interests of a local
' See 669 F.2d at 929-32; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942) (state law
must yield to international agreement); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937)
(international agreement is superior to state law because national government has power to
control foreign affairs); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)
(federal government has sole power to conduct foreign relations).
" United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). In Curtiss-Wright,
the Supreme Court found that when the American colonies adopted the Constitution, the
colonies delegated to the federal government certain powers that each colony then possessed.
Id. at 316; see U.S. CONST. amend. X (powers that Constitution does not specifically delegate
to federal government are reserved to states). The Gurtiss-Wright Court found that since
individual colonies never possessed power of external sovereignty, the colonies could not
have transferred those powers to the national government. 299 U.S. at 316-17.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936).
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324, 330 (1937). The Supreme Court has held that the executive branch has the authority to
recognize a foreign state, to establish diplomatic relations, and to make agreements concern-
ing international relations. 301 U.S. at 330. In United States v. Pink and United States v.
Belmont, as in Arlington, the United States brought suit to enforce the United States'
obligations under an international agreement. 315 U.S. at 210-13; 301 U.S. at 325-26; 669
F.2d at 928. The Pink and Belmont Courts concluded that the national government has ex-
clusive power over international affairs. 315 U.S. at 233; 301 U.S. at 330; accord United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger,
385 F. Supp. 769, 773 (D.D.C. 1974). The Supreme Court has ruled that the federal govern-
ment may carry out foreign relations without regard to state laws and policies. 315 U.S. at
233-34; 301 U.S. at 331. The Court has further determined that when the United States sues
to enforce foreign policy, state laws must yield to the nation's international agreements. 315
U.S. at 234; 301 U.S. at 332. The Pink Court recognized that the entire nation could suffer if
a state refused to comply with the federal government's foreign affairs decisions because
the state's noncooperation could give rise to friction between the United States and another
sovereign. 315 U.S. at 232.
" See supra notes 50 & 53 and accompanying text (state laws may not interfere with
federal government's conduct of foreign affairs).
" See City of New Rochelle v. Republic of Ghana, 44 Misc. 2d 773, 775, 255 N.Y.S.2d
178, 180 (Westchester County Ct. 1964) (granting tax exemptions for diplomatic residences
could impose hardship on municipality and municipality's residents). Arlington County
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government must yield to the welfare of the nation. 6 By granting
reciprocal tax exemptions for foreign states' diplomatic property, the
United States benefits by receiving tax immunity for United States'
diplomatic property located abroad-7 Based on Supreme Court rulings
and foreign policy considerations, the Fourth Circuit correctly held that
the May Agreement exempting the GDR's apartment building from local
real estate taxes prevailed over Arlington County's need to assess taxes
upon the property. 8
The Arlington court is the first circuit court to hold that the Im-
munities Act bars a local government from enforcing a tax lien against a
foreign sovereign's diplomatic property. Few courts have addressed the
issue of whether a foreign state's diplomatic and consular property is ex-
empt from local real estate taxes.59 The New York state courts have
held, however, that treaty obligations or customary practices of interna-
tional law6" may provide tax immunity for diplomatic and consular offices
and residences. 1 In addition, in United States v. City of Glen Cove, 2 the
stands to lose over $20,000 per year in tax revenues because of the county's inability to tax
the GDR's apartment house. See supra notes 16 & 25 (amount of property taxes assessed
against GDR's property). The County can, however, make up for the loss by assessing
higher taxes on non-tax-exempt properties. See 44 Misc. 2d at 775, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 180 (dic-
tum) (municipality may raise taxes on residents' property to make up for revenues lost on
nontaxable diplomatic property). In addition, under the Vienna Convention, Arlington County
may bill the GDR for specific services that the county provides for the GDR's property. See
Vienna Convention, supra note 14, art. 23(1), 23 U.S.T. at 3238 (sending state must pay host
government for specific services that host government has rendered); id. art. 34(e), 23
U.S.T. at 3243 (diplomat must pay host government for specific services that host govern-
ment has rendered); supra note 14 (Vienna Convention provisions for tax exemption).
I See supra notes 50 & 53 and accompanying text (international agreement that
federal government negotiated is superior to state law).
See Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 25 N.Y.2d 252, 260-61, 250 N.E.2d
698, 701, 303 N.Y.S.2d 644, 649 (1969) (nations grant tax exemptions to foreign diplomatic
property as matter of comity); C. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 102 (1967)
(tax exemption necessary for effective functioning of diplomatic relations).
5 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (Supreme Court decisions holding that
local laws and policies must yield to international agreement); supra notes 55-57 and accom-
panying text (foreign relations considerations support reciprocal agreement to exempt
diplomatic property from local tax).
" But see infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (courts that have considered
whether foreign state's diplomatic and consular property is exempt from local real estate
taxes).
Customary practices of international law are established rules of law based on the
general practices of nations. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686, 700, 708 (1900).
Customary international law need not be codified by treaty. See id.
" See Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 25 N.Y.2d 252, 259, 250 N.E.2d 698,
700, 303 N.Y.S.2d 644, 647-48 (1969) (principles of international law exempt consular office
from real estate taxation); Republic of Finland v. Town of Pelham, 26 A.D.2d 35, 38, 270
N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (1966) (treaty exempts residence of consul general from local taxation); City
of New Rochelle v. Republic of Ghana, 44 Misc. 2d 773, 774, 255 N.Y.S.2d 178, 180
(Westchester County Ct. 1964) (tax liens against residences of United Nations ambassadors
dismissed because court lacked jurisdiction to enforce liens).
322 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 450 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1971).
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York con-
sidered whether a municipal government could enforce a tax lien against
property that a foreign sovereign owned and used to house the
sovereign's diplomats." The Glen Cove court found that a treaty govern-
ing the United States' obligations to the foreign state exempted the
foreign state's diplomatic residences from local taxes. 4 The court ruled
that a municipal government may not deprive a foreign sovereign of a
treaty benefit. 5 The Glen Cove court therefore enjoined the munici-
pality from enforcing the tax lien against the foreign sovereign's prop-
erty." The Arlington court's decision is consistent with the Glen Cove
court's decision and with the New York state cases which recognize that
a local government may not tax a foreign state's diplomatic property
when the United States' foreign relations obligations require tax im-
munity for the property. 7
Congress enacted the Immunities Act to transfer immunities-related
decisions from the executive branch to the judiciary.66 The Arlington
court's reliance on the State Department's determination that the GDR
used the apartment building for diplomatic mission purposes seems to
contravene the purpose of the Immunities Act. 9 The Fourth Circuit,
however, had valid reasons for considering the State Department's
determination. Moreover, the Arlington court emphasized that the
State Department's opinion did not require the court to hold that the
" 322 F. Supp. at 150. In United States v. City of Glen Cove, the United States sued
Glen Cove to enjoin the city from enforcing a tax lien against property that the Soviet
Union owned. Id. The Soviet Union used the property as a residence for representatives to
the United Nations. Id. at 151.
Id. at 152; see Consular Convention, June 1, 1964, United States-U.S.S.R., art. 21, 19
U.S.T. 5018, 5033, T.I.A.S. No. 6503 (diplomats' residences exempt from tax). The Glen Cove
court recognized that the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union exempted
diplomats' residences from taxes other than taxes that represented bills for specific ser-
vices rendered. See 322 F. Supp. at 152; Consular Convention, supra, art. 21, 19 U.S.T. at
5033. The Glen Cove court found that the taxes Glen Cove sought to collect were for the
general support of the city government and not for specific services rendered. 322 F. Supp.
at 155.
322 F. Supp. at 154-55.
Id. at 155.
67 See supra note 35 and text accompanying notes 35,39 & 43 (Arlington court's decision
exempting GDR's apartment house from local taxation); supra note 61 and accompanying
text (New York State courts finding foreign state's diplomatic property exempt from
municipal-taxation); supra note 64 and text accompanying notes 64-65 (Glen Cove decision
that treaty exempted foreign government's diplomatic residence from taxation).
" See supra note 10 and accompanying text (Immunities Act requires that courts
determine questions of foreign sovereign immunity).
"' See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (Arlington court relied on State
Department's determination that GDR used apartment building for diplomatic mission pur-
poses).
'0 See supra note 48 and text accompanying notes 47-48 (reasons for Arlington court's
reliance on State Department's views).
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GDR's property supported the diplomatic mission.71 Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit's dependence on the executive branch's view is not im-
proper under the Immunities Act.
Congress required the judiciary to decide questions of foreign
sovereign immunity because judicial determinations of immunity would
minimize the foreign policy implications of immunities decisions.72 The
Arlington case, however, shows how judicial decisions under the Im-
munities Act may affect foreign relations." The United States' relations
with the GDR could have been affected adversely had the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision that Arlington County could en-
force a tax lien against the GDR's apartment house.74
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Arlington prevents a local govern-
ment from collecting real estate taxes on property that a foreign
sovereign owns and uses for housing the sovereign's diplomats.75 The
Fourth Circuit properly determined that the federal government has the
power to exempt a foreign sovereign's diplomatic property from taxes.78
The court also correctly construed the Immunities Act to bar Arlington
County from enforcing a tax lien against the GDR's apartment house."
The Arlington court's decision may impose financial hardships on the
local government.78 To allow a local government to collect taxes from a
foreign sovereign, however, could hamper the United States' conduct of
foreign relations.79
DONA A. SZAK
' See 669 F.2d at 934 (State Department's opinions on scope of Immunities Act not
conclusive).
" See supra note 10 and accompanying text (reasons for Immunities Act's requirement
that courts determine questions of foreign sovereign immunity).
I A court's erroneous decision under the Immunities Act could hamper relations be-
tween the United States and a nation that was a defendant in a lawsuit based on the Im-
munities Act. In Arlington, for example, the GDR resorted to the State Department for
assistance after the district court had held that the GDR's apartment house was subject to a
tax lien. 669 F.2d at 928. Relations between the United States and the GDR might have
deteriorated had the State Department not acted to prevent Arlington County from en-
forcing the tax lien.
", See supra note 73 and accompanying text (enforcement of tax lien against GDR's
apartment house could affect adversely relations between United States and GDR).
" See 669 F.2d at 932, 935.
76 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (federal government's power to enter
into international agreements).
See supra note 8 and accompanying text (Immunities Act).
7' See supra note 55 and accompanying text (exempting diplomatic residences from
real estate taxation may impose burden on local government).
I United States v. City of Glen Cove, 322 F. Supp. 149, 152 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 450 F.2d
884 (2d Cir. 1971); Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 25 N.Y.2d 252, 259, 250
N.E.2d 698, 700, 303 N.Y.S.2d 644, 647 (1969); C. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IM-
MUNITIES 102 (1967).
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